Abstract: This paper provides new estimates of the evolution of pay inequality in overall pay inequality has decreased, with between-province and between-sector inequality both showing steady declines. In these respects, the evolution of pay inequality in China mirrors the trajectory expected under the hypothesis of a Kuznets curve.
Introduction
As Kuznets (1955) taught, economic inequality usually increases in the early stages of development. As countries urbanize and industrialize, the gaps between town and country, factory and farm assure that inequality continues rising -until it reaches a tipping point, when the rural sector starts to lose its preeminent position in the economy.
Inequality declines afterward. The rise in inequality within China has been for decades one of the most important and well-known features of Chinese development, and most observers believe that it is an ongoing phenomenon. This paper asks, is it over? Has Chinese development crossed the Kuznets threshold? And if so, when did this happen?
We shall argue that the geographic threshold was crossed more than a decade ago, around 2002, and that an overall threshold for declining inequality was reached at the time of the
Great Financial Crisis in 2008.
China has pursued economic reform since 1978. Favored by the open-door policy and special economic zones, a handful of coastal provinces and eastern municipalities have become the biggest beneficiaries of economic reform, while vast interior provinces remain relatively poor and underdeveloped. As Deng Xiaoping's favorite slogan described, some in China have to become rich first. But the rest do not necessarily follow.
Unbalanced economic development underlies a dramatic rise of economic inequality in China, especially since the early 1990s. From the 2000s, this rise has become both a focal point of public attention and a headache for the Chinese state.
Rising economic inequality in China is well-documented. Many studies have concentrated rural-urban income inequality, its formation, direction and social and political effects (Tsui, 1991; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Benjamin, et al. 2005; Wu and Perloff, 2005; Sicular et al., 2006; Luo and Zhu, 2008; Riskin and Gao, 2008) . Driving forces range from household characteristics such as location and education (Sicular, et al. 2006; Luo and Zhu, 2008) to policy-related factors, such as economic restructuring and rural-urban reclassification (Benjamin, et al. 2005) , the revival of market forces (Riskin and Gao, 2008) , and the degree of decentralization (Lin, 1999; Kanbur and Zhang, 2005) .
Rising interprovincial inequality is another well-covered topic (Tsui, 1993 and Gustafsson and Li, 2002; Shorrocks and Wan 2005; Fan and Sun, 2008; Griesand Redlin, 2008; Hao and Wei, 2010; Li and Wei 2010) . Galbraith, Krytynskaia and Wang (2004) showed that much of the rise could be attributed to the relative gains of just few provinces and municipalities, namely Guangdong, Shanghai and Beijing. Major losers in regional (and relative) terms included the Northeast (Manchuria) and the Southwest (Sichuan). Trade, government expenditures, foreign and domestic capital investments, globalization and marketization as well as human capital have been identified as key policy determinants of rising inequality (Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Tsui, 2007; Griesand Redlin, 2008) . However, we have seen no other study suggest that inequality in China has peaked or is declining.
In this study, we aim at providing some new evidence of the evolution of China's inequality, using the Theil's T Statistics with province and sector as main groups. We are interested in exploring the main factors that may influence the inequality trend. We would also like to investigate whether China mirrors the Kuznets process that is the catch up of the Chinese economy as a whole toward the standard of development and pay set initially in a very small part of this vast country.
The evolution of pay inequality in China from 1987 to 2012
We present new estimates of the evolution of pay inequality in China from 1987 to 2012.
The metric is the between-provinces and between-sectors components of Theil's Tstatistic; the underlying data are wage and employment records from the annual statistical yearbooks, for which consistent classification schemes exist (or can be constructed) going back to 1988. The employment data refer to the total number of staff and workers at yearend, by sector and province. The pay data are the total wage bills for these personnel.
The coverage of these tables is not complete. According to the editors' explanatory notes (NBS, 2012) , staff and workers covered are those who "work in and receive payment from units of state ownership, collective ownership, joint ownership, shareholding ownership, foreign ownership and ownership by entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan." Persons employed in township enterprises, persons employed in private enterprises, self-employed persons, foreigners and persons from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are not included. Total wage bills are the total remuneration to all staff and workers in all formal sectors during the reporting period. These bills include hourly-paid wages, piece-rate wages, bonuses, allowance and subsidies, overtime wages and wages paid under special circumstances. The wage bills are pre-tax and no social insurance premiums, utility bills, housing funds or subsidies are deducted (NBS, 2012) . Figure 1 presents a broad overview of the evolution of pay inequality in China, both overall and by region and sector, from 1987 to 2012. As Figure 1 shows, pay inequality in China began rising in 1992, both between-provinces and between-sectors, as well as overall. However, in in the 2000s the behavior of these two dimensions of inequality diverged (Galbraith, Hsu and Zhang, 2009) 1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 20 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 The relative decline of Guangdong is also not accidental. As one of the first economic special zones in China established in 1980, Guangdong has attracted huge amounts of foreign investment and capital in support of its economic development. The average pay in Guangdong province was much higher than the national average. However, with the rapid rise of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang in the 1990s, Guangdong has gradually lost its advantage in manufacturing, and the mean wage in Guangdong has also become less attractive. Shanghai, and Jiangsu remain the major forces widening the wage gap within provinces.
During the 1990s, the contributions of these five regions were relatively small, fluctuating between 14 and 18 per cent. Nevertheless, since 1999 they have risen significantly, as the total contribution of these five regions to within-province, betweensector inequality in China has jumped from 22 to 56 per cent. This phenomenon implies that the wage difference between economic sectors in these rapidly developing regions is much higher than that in the rest of China. Therefore, the length of each curve is different. Tables 1 and 2 show the contribution of particular sector-province cells to overall inequality in selected years. In each table, the top ten contributors from above and below are both listed. It is interesting to note that the forces pulling from both directions have changed significantly over two decades. In 1988, for instance, the farming sector in Hebei was the biggest positive contributor to overall pay inequality, while the biggest relative losers were people working in the farming sector in Heilongjiang. In 1996, the biggest winners were in the banking and insurance sectors in Guangdong. Meanwhile, Guangdong province and Shanghai each had four places among the top ten, while the other two were taken by Beijing. But this situation has changed again since 2002. In 2009, while Beijing took seven places among the top ten sectors with the highest wages, while Guangdong has disappeared from the top ten. On the other hand, the list of losers has not greatly changed. Figures 7, 8 and 9 present profiles of pay inequality in three large geographical units. As Figure 7 shows, the pattern of wage differences among eastern provinces follows the same trajectory as national pay inequality. However, this pattern did not occur in western and central regions. Within western and central China, the variation between provinces is very small, whereas wage differences within provinces are substantial. This observation implies that there is no obvious difference in average pay between poor provinces. The poor provinces remain poor, but they are also internally unequal. 12 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 The source of changing inequalities can be either changes in relative earnings or changes in employment share. Generally speaking, changes in either wage or employment may have different effects on inequality in high and low-wage sectors.
2 In high-wage sectors, inequality will rise if relative wage increases or employment share increases; inequality will drop if either dimension declines. However, if the behavior of relative wage and employment share diverge in high-wage sectors, more evidences is needed to determine the inequality trend. In low-wage sectors, inequality will rise if the relative wage drops or employment share increases. But, if either dimension encounters a decrease or increase in low-wage sectors, further investigation will be needed. Table 3 summarizes how the compositional change of relative wage and employment share may influence inequality trend. Note: (+) represents an increase of relative wage or employment share; (-) represents a decrease of relative wage or employment share. Table 4 , 5 and 6 show these compositional effects in different sectors during three periods. As displayed in Table 4 , from 1993 to 2002 nine sectors experienced great growth in both relative wage and employment share. They are: 1) banking and insurance, 2) real estate, 3) education and entertainment, 4) healthcare and sports, 5) utilities, 6) scientific research, 7) social welfare, 8) government agencies and social organizations, and 9) transportation and telecommunication. Among these, the banking and insurance sector and the real estate sector saw the most rapid growth in both relative wage and employment share, which, to a large extent, reflects the financial boom and real property prosperity of the 1990s in China. Conversely, the low-wage sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, farming and fishery, excavation and geological prospecting and water conservancy, all declined considerably in both dimensions. But shrinking employment in these sectors cannot offset the dramatic decrease in their relative earnings, since the change of employment share is significantly smaller than the change of relative wage. Therefore, they continue to widen the wage gap from below. dimensions, resulting in a declining tendency of between-sector inequality. For low-wage sectors, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and hotels and restaurants all gained momentum in relative wage and employment share, again contributing to a reduction in inter-sector inequality. Manufacturing encountered a rise in relative wage and a decline in employment share, which also led to declining inequality. In the farming and fishing sector, more people left as the average earning continued to drop, which ironically resulted in narrowing the inter-sector pay gap. Although the average pay in this sector increased every year during this period, it increased at a much slower rate than the national average. Thus, until 2012 the average pay of government agencies and social organizations has dropped below the national average and become a relatively low-wage sector.
In the meantime, sectors such as finance and information technology have also shown declining growth rate of the average pay and shrinking employment. The withering of these high flyers after the global financial crisis has directly resulted in a decline in intersector inequality. This is also evident in Figure 14 . This new urbanization plan leads us to rethink the Kuznets hypothesis. If expanding urbanization has become an effective tool to reduce inequality in the current stage of China's development, does it mean China has attained the development level at which inequality start to decline as the country industrialize more and urbanize on a larger scale? Does it imply that China has reached the Kuznets threshold? Our findings suggest that the inter-provincial threshold was crossed already a decade ago. Since then, overall inequality had remained relatively stable until it finally declined in 2009, as the global collapse compounded the inter-provincial decline. Kuznets, it appears, was on to something.
